国际政治
2026年深圳APEC与朝鲜
中文译文
2026年亚太经济合作组织(APEC)峰会刚刚在中国深圳闭幕,此时国际秩序在全球和地区层面都处于关键时期。
最受关注的当属美国、中国和俄罗斯领导人首次举行的三方峰会,它获得了最多的媒体报道。
这次三方会议具有历史意义,但结局却令人失望。除了一份极为笼统的声明外,几乎没有实质性的成果。它注重表面形象,却缺乏实质内容。
乌克兰和伊朗这两大地区冲突,以及东亚地区的朝鲜半岛和台湾海峡安全问题,均未在声明中提及。
这并非因为这些问题不重要,恰恰相反,这些问题极为重要,但美中俄三国的利益差异过大,难以在一份简短的声明中达成共识。最终,这场三方会议吸引了全球大部分的关注,美国的盟友也表达了严重的担忧与批评。它成为了最受瞩目的事件,甚至盖过了APEC峰会的风头。
另一方面,美朝会晤并未举行。尽管有诸多猜测称朝鲜领导人金正恩可能会出席双边会晤,但直到唐纳德·特朗普总统离开峰会之前,这一切都未能成真。
这成了最重大的“无事件”。未能举行会晤的背后原因尚不清楚,但各种猜测纷纷出现,从朝鲜试图施加更大压力,到中国希望避免在自家领土上重演2019年金正恩与特朗普在河内举行的无果会晤。
在此,我们有三个全球性和地区性的影响需要关注:首先,这些现象表明,大国政治的阴影仍在全球和地区国家间关系中挥之不去。小国越来越担心大国之间会形成势力范围勾结的局面。
其次,人们担心大国政治的回归会自然而然地将小国排除在外。尽管有诸多讨论和猜测,但乌克兰、欧洲和韩国等关切方并未被纳入拟议中的美中俄三方或美朝双边会晤框架之中。
最后,对于朝鲜半岛而言,困境在于不存在任何可行的政策选择。所有选项看起来都不理想,因为没有一种方式能够以令双方都满意的方式兼顾各自的利益。即便选择相对较差的方案来推进事务,双方也必须准备好进行对话、谈判和妥协。这难以交给第三方来处理。正因如此,韩国应坚持亲自参与谈判。
然而,我们还必须假定这些趋势预示着长期的发展方向,即便特朗普离任后情况依然如此。这就要求我们认真考虑针对未来可能出现对韩国不利情况的备选计划。该计划必须明确,并能由可信赖的第三方代表我们来实施。
我们首先应制定一份包含路线图及关键里程碑的行动计划。最终目标应是建立在完全无核化与韩朝和平条约基础上的持久和平。
对韩国而言,无核化必须始终是不可以任何代价妥协的终极目标。一旦制定出行动计划,我们就必须先整顿国内局势。没有国内共识,无论是大国还是朝鲜都不会予以尊重。
接着,我们应该与我们的长期盟友美国取得联系,鉴于朝鲜坚持只愿与美国对话,美国很可能会担任我们的谈判代表。
韩国、美国和日本之间的三方合作必须为我们的行动计划提供支持。
我们还需尽最大努力向中国和俄罗斯说明该计划的可行性。
最后,我们必须随时做好准备并愿意以任何形式恢复朝韩接触,直到朝鲜作出回应。鉴于目前依然存在的高度紧张局势和不信任感,有必要恢复热线等沟通渠道,以防止事态升级为冲突。
同时也要重新开启对话渠道,让双方能够就分歧进行沟通。
在追求一个没有核武器的和平朝鲜半岛的道路上,我们必须保持耐心和坚持。金元洙是庆熙大学未来文明全球学院的院长,也曾担任联合国副秘书长兼裁军事务高级代表。
原文
The 2026 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit just concluded in Shenzhen, China at a critical moment for the international order at both the global and regional levels.
The limelight belonged to the first-ever trilateral summit meeting held between the leaders of the United States, China and Russia, which drew the most media coverage.
The trilateral meeting was historic, but it ended in an anti-climactic way. Except for a very generic statement, there were few tangible outcomes. It was heavy on optics but shallow in substance.
Two outstanding regional conflicts — Ukraine and Iran — were not included in the statement, nor the two key issues in East Asia of security on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.
This is not because these issues do not matter. The opposite is the case. These issues matter a lot but the interests of these three powers are too far apart to bridge in a short statement.
In the end, the trilateral meeting drew most of the global attention, including serious concerns and criticisms expressed by U.S. allies. It became the biggest event, overshadowing the APEC summit itself.
On the other hand, a U.S.-North Korea meeting didn’t happen. Despite hype and speculation that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un might show up for a bilateral meeting, nothing materialized up until President Donald Trump’s departure from the summit.
It became the biggest non-event. The factors behind the lack of a meeting are unknown, but theories are being floated, ranging from North Korea attempting to up the ante to Chinese desire to avoid a repeat of Kim and Trump’s 2019 fruitless meeting in Hanoi on its soil.
There are three global and regional implications we should note here:
First and foremost, they show the lingering ghost of big power politics returning to global and regional inter-state relations. Smaller powers are increasingly nervous about the prospects of spheres-of-influence collusion by big powers.
Secondly, this concern that the return of big power politics naturally risks excluding smaller powers. Despite a lot of talk and speculation, concerned parties like Ukraine, Europe and South Korea were not included in the proposed formats of trilateral (U.S.-China-Russia) or bilateral (U.S.-North Korea) meetings.
Last but not least, for the Korean Peninsula, the dilemma is that there is no single feasible policy option. All options look bad, as there is no option to accommodate both sides' interests in a mutually satisfying way.
Even to move forward with the least bad option means both sides must be ready to talk, negotiate and compromise. This is hard to delegate to the third party. It is why South Korea should insist on being at the negotiating table.
However, we must also assume the trends signify how things will play out in the long term, persisting even after Trump leaves office. This requires us to think seriously about plan B for future contingencies where things develop in a way less optimal to South Korea. This plan must be clear and deliverable by a reliable third party on our behalf.
The first thing we should do is to make a game plan containing a road map and key milestones leading to it. The end must be a durable peace backed by complete denuclearization and an inter-Korean peace treaty.
For South Korea, denuclearization must stay as the ultimate goal which can’t be traded off at any cost.
Once the game plan is drafted, we must put our domestic house in order. Without domestic consensus, neither the big powers nor North Korea will respect it.
Then we should reach out to our long-time ally, the U.S., which can most likely serve as our negotiator given North Korea’s insistence on talking to the U.S. only.
Trilateral work between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan must support our game plan.
We also need to do our best to impress the feasibility of our plan on China and Russia.
Lastly, we must remain ready and willing at all times to resume inter-Korean contact in any form until North Korea reciprocates. Given the high level tension and mistrust that persists, hotlines and other channels for communication need to be restored to prevent incidents from escalating into a conflict.
Dialogue channels also need to be reopened to let both sides talk out their differences.
We must be patient and persistent in our pursuit of a peaceful Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.
Kim Won-soo is the rector of the Global Academy for Future Civilizations at Kyung Hee University and the former United Nations Under Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament
