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特朗普针对《纽约时报》的部分诽谤指控可继续推进审理

来源:Reason 杂志发布 上传时间 (多伦多时间)1 家来源 · 1 篇报道

中文译文

来自佛罗里达州医学博士史蒂文·梅里戴法官在昨日的“特朗普诉《纽约时报》公司案”中的判决:

《泰晤士报诉沙利文案》指出,第一修正案“禁止公职人员就与其公务行为相关的诽谤性虚假言论寻求赔偿,除非其能够证明该言论是出于‘恶意’——也就是说,明知其为虚假仍故意传播,或罔顾其真实性而随意传播”。……“尽管‘恶意’有其通常的含义和用法,但关于恶意、不当动机或个人敌意的指控在判断被告是否出于恶意方面并无作用”,因为“恶意并不涉及恶意、不当动机或个人敌意”,这一结论在法律上似乎是正确的,即便在英语语言的其他用法或普遍认知中并非如此。总之,“实际恶意并非指发言者是否有邪恶意图或出于恶意而行事。” “即便一个谨慎的人本应进行调查,但若未进行调查,这并不足以构成肆意忽视的行为。”——Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton(1989年)。

“当有明显理由怀疑信息提供者的真实性或其报告的准确性时,可认定存在肆意忽视的行为。” “虽然仅因未进行调查不足以认定存在实际恶意,但故意回避真相则属于另一类情况。”……

法院认为,特朗普声称具有诽谤性质的诸多言论因“被告在驳回申请中充分阐述的种种原因”而不具备可诉性。但法院同时认定,即便存在“实际恶意”的要求,仍有部分言论可能具有可诉性。正如投诉中所称,《倒霉赢家》一书包含以下内容:(1)“唐纳德·特朗普从父亲那里获得了相当于4亿多美元的款项,其中大部分是通过欺诈性的逃税手段获得的”;(2)“用税法术语来说,弗雷德以贷款的名义向儿子赠送了应纳税的礼物,这很可能是一种未被发现的税务欺诈行为”;(3)“很快便有人想出了一个办法,将弗雷德的一些现金转交给唐纳德和他的三个兄弟姐妹。他们通过为弗雷德的生意增设一层虚假结构来实现这一目的,以此逃避赠与税和遗产税”;(4)“于是特朗普一家开始提交虚高的账单,向州政府官员要求提高租金。唐纳德·特朗普那些未入账的遗产成本便转嫁给了他父亲那些收入一般的租户身上”。(5) “通过各种信托基金、虚开发票的手段,以及其他用于在赠与税和遗产税制度之外转移其父亲财富的伎俩,唐纳德每年已能从其父亲的公司中获得近200万美元。由于他自己的企业失败,这些钱得以免于缴税”;(6) “唐纳德·特朗普此前也曾面临过这样的时刻,即似乎仅靠激进的税务手段或逃避债务已无法挽救他的困境”。正如投诉中所描述的,第二篇文章中还包含如下陈述:(7) “联邦、州和地方当局调查了他与黑手党的关系,发现他存在洗钱违规行为,并因违反股票交易规则而对他进行了处罚。”在这七起案件中,投诉中的指控相当合理地让人推断,作者和出版商知晓那些指控原告策划并实施复杂犯罪、故意获取这些犯罪所得及其他利益的陈述“是基于不完整、极少的信息”,而且作者和出版商“明白,要对特朗普家族遵守税法的情况进行恰当评估,就需要进行法务审计、寻求税务和法律方面的专家意见,以及使用其他昂贵的调查手段”。此外,投诉还称,作者和出版商知晓“特朗普总统和弗雷德·特朗普都未曾因税务欺诈而受到调查、起诉或定罪……”换言之,诉状中所称的事实至少可以合理推断出,原告和出版商明知,若不依赖在经过必要的事实与法律研究分析后得出的专业意见,就无法对违反税法的行为,尤其是遗产税和赠与税方面的违法行为,得出可靠的结论,而他们却故意没有获取这样的专业意见。

被告针对原告基于犯罪指控提出的主张作出了如下回应:克雷格和布特纳“分析了约十万页的经审计的财务报表、纳税申报表、银行记录、一般记录以及法律文件。”他们关于税务欺诈的结论得到了众多专家的指导。2018年的文章引用了“赠与税和遗产税法律方面的专家”李-福特·特里特的话,他认为特朗普家族对All County公司的使用“极其可疑”,可能构成刑事税务欺诈;还引用了“曼哈顿地区检察官办公室的前调查主管”亚当·S·考夫曼的话,他认为这“很像犯罪行为”;此外还引用了税务法律教授米切尔·甘斯的话,他解释了如何通过赠与税申报表来规避美国国税局的审查。依赖专家意见可以反驳故意犯罪的主观意图——尤其是当原告像本案一样没有试图对这种依赖提出质疑时。参见例如Levan v. Cap. Cities/ABC, Inc.(第11巡回法院,1999年)案(依赖“众多客观专家”和“行业专业人士”可推翻故意犯罪的主观意图);Silvester v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc.(第11巡回法院)案。1988年)(在面临相关指控时,由于“相关内容是通过与专家的访谈经过充分研究的”,故不存在恶意)。

针对有关税务犯罪指控依据的提问,被告们提到了该书“致谢”部分的第451页,其中写道:“在探讨税务法中那些高度专业的领域时,若没有几位专家的慷慨帮助,我们恐怕会无从下手。我们对吉姆·莱德利怀有特殊的感激之情,他是纽约最著名的遗产与信托律师之一,他极具耐心,还无私地付出了大量时间。正是他让这些复杂的工作变得有趣。”显然,即便是一位合格的专家,若仅给出诸如某笔交易“可疑”或“可能”违反法律之类的表面性描述,或给该交易贴上(未明确且未定义的)犯罪标签,或指出礼品税申报表可规避美国国税局的审查,又或慷慨地投入自己极其宝贵的时间来帮助那些“被复杂情况困扰”的外行,这些都远称不上是正式的法律意见,不足以消除针对某人涉嫌欺诈、逃税或与特定交易相关的其他犯罪行为——包括那些据称通过“与黑手党的关系”实施的犯罪——的陈述在真实性和准确性方面的严重疑虑。准确侦破税务犯罪及其他犯罪行为,包括洗钱行为——那些在某些受到质疑的陈述中被指为原告所实施的犯罪,即包括遗产税和赠与税在内的各类税务犯罪——是一项极度依赖事实的工作,而相关法律规定极为复杂,只有少数专业的法律从业者具备处理此类案件的能力。

任何声称他人实施了那些在某些受到质疑的陈述中所描述的复杂性质犯罪的人,如果在彻底审查相关事实后并未获得合格机构给出的明确意见,那么他们必然有充分的理由怀疑自己陈述的真实性,并且清楚这些陈述极有可能属于虚假信息;换言之,他们知道自己并不确定,但却依然继续这么做。明知需要那种意见却未能获得,这是故意回避真相的典型例子,这种明知故犯的行为即便在“泰姆斯诉沙利文案”之后依然可被追究责任。

原文

From Judge Steven Merryday (M.D. Fla.) yesterday in Trump v. N.Y. Times Co.:

Times v. Sullivan states that the First Amendment "prohibits a public official's recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." … {[N]otwithstanding the ordinary meaning and usage of "actual malice," "allegations of ill-will, improper motive or personal animosity play no role in determining whether a defendant acted with actual malice," which "does not concern ill-will, improper motive, or personal animosity," a conclusion which appears correct, in law if not elsewhere in the English language or in the common understanding. In sum, "actual malice is not about whether the speaker had evil intent or a motive arising from ill-will."} "[F]ailure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard[.]" Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton (1989).

[But] "reckless disregard may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his report." "Although failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category." …

The court concluded that a large set of statements that Trump alleges to be libelous aren't actionable, "for one or more of the many and varied reasons amply and ably explained by the defendants in the motion to dismiss." But it concludes that several statements may be actionable, even given the "actual malice" requirement:

[A]s alleged in the complaint, the book, Lucky Loser, includes these statements: (1) "Donald Trump had received the equivalent of more than $400 million from his father, much of it through fraudulent tax evasion schemes"; (2) "In the language of the tax code, Fred had given his son taxable gifts masquerading as loans, a likely tax fraud that went unnoticed"; (3) "A plan was soon devised to funnel some of Fred's cash to Donald and his three siblings. They would accomplish that goal by adding a sham layer to Fred's business, one designed to evade the gift and estate taxes"; (4) "So the Trumps began submitting the padded bills to request rent increases from state officials. Part of the cost of Donld Trump's off-the-books inheritance would be passed along to this father's middle-income tenants"; (5) "Between the trust funds, the invoice-padding operation, and other devices created to siphon off his father's wealth outside the gift and estate tax system, Donald was already collecting almost $2 million a year from his father companies. His own business failures meant he kept that money tax-free"; and (6) "Donald Trump had faced these moments before, periods when it seemed his failures could not be saved only by aggressive tax maneuvers or not paying his debts". As described in the complaint, the second article includes the statement (7) "Federal, state and local authorities looked into his ties with the Mafia, found violations of money laundering rules and penalized him for skirting stock trade rules."

In these seven instances, the allegations of the complaint quite plausibly and reasonably create an inference that the authors and the publishers knew that these statements, accusing the plaintiff of planning and perpetrating complex crimes and knowingly receiving the proceeds and other benefits of these crimes, were "based on incomplete, minimal information" and that the author and the publisher "realized that a responsible assessment of the Trump family's compliance with tax laws would have required forensic auditing, expert tax and legal advice, and other expensive investigatory tools." Further, the complaint alleges that the authors and the publishers knew that "neither President Trump nor Fred Trump was investigated for, charged with, or convicted of tax fraud …."

In other words, the facts alleged in the complaint create at least a plausible inference that the authors and the publishers knew that no reliable conclusion about violations of the tax laws, including especially the estate and gift tax laws, is possible without reliance on qualified opinion formulated after the necessary factual and legal research and analysis, which they knowingly failed to obtain.

The defendants respond in part to the plaintiff's claims based on allegations of crime as follows:

Craig and Buettner "analyz[ed] about one hundred thousand pages of audited financial statements, tax returns, bank records, general records, and legal papers." Their conclusions regarding tax fraud were informed by numerous experts. The 2018 Article quotes Lee-Ford Tritt, an "expert in gift and estate tax law," who said the Trumps' use of All County was "highly suspicious" and could constitute criminal tax fraud; Adam S. Kauf-mann, "a former chief of investigations for the Manhattan district attorney's office," who said it "smells like a crime"; and Mitchell Gans, a tax law professor, who explained how gift tax returns can evade IRS scrutiny. Reliance on experts controverts actual malice—particularly when, as here, Plaintiff makes no effort to challenge such reliance. See, e.g., Levan v. Cap. Cities/ABC, Inc. (11th Cir. 1999) (reliance on "numerous objective experts" and "industry professionals" defeated actual malice); Silvester v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. (11th Cir. 1988) (no actual malice where challenged publication "was thoroughly researched through interviews with experts").

In response to a question about the basis for the accusation of tax crimes, the defendants identified page 451 in the "Acknowledgements" section of the book, which states, "In coming to terms with the highly technical areas of tax law, we would have been lost in the weeds without the generous help of several experts. We hold a special place in our hearts for Jim Ledley, one of the most prominent estate and trust lawyers in New York, who was endlessly patient and exceptionally generous with his time. Jim made the arcane work fun."

Obviously, even a qualified expert's offering a superficial characterization such as a transaction is "suspicious" or "could" violate the law or attributing to a transaction the (unspecified and undefined) "smell" of crime or noting that a gift tax return can evade IRS scrutiny or generously giving his immensely valuable time to aid laypersons "lost in the weeds" is far from a formal legal opinion sufficient to remove serious doubt about the truthfulness and accuracy of a statement accusing a specific person of fraud or tax evasion or some related crime arising from a specific transaction, including a crime allegedly effected through "ties to the Mafia." The confident detection of tax and other crimes, including money laundering, of the kind that some of the challenged statements attribute to the plaintiff, that is, tax crimes including estate and gift tax crimes and the like, is a task that is intensely fact-dependent, and the law that governs is singularly complex and within the immediate competence of only a relatively small cohort of specialized practitioners.

Anyone who publishes the claim that someone else has committed a crime of the complex nature described in some of the challenged statements and who has not received an explicit opinion from a qualified source after a thorough examination of pertinent facts necessarily proceeds with particularized reason to doubt the truth of their statements and with knowledge of a high degree of probable falsity of the statements; in other words, they know that they don't know, but they are undeterred. Knowing of the necessity for that opinion but failing to procure that opinion is a fine example of the purposeful avoidance of the truth, a knowing failure that remains actionable, even after Times v. Sullivan….