其他
第二修正案是否既保障拥有和购买枪支的权利,也保障销售枪支的权利?
中文译文
在昨日提交的、由第五巡回法院法官詹姆斯·霍和安德鲁·奥尔德姆撰写的未署名判决意见中,涉及美国诉迪尔案:
杰里迈亚·迪尔因违反《美国法典》第18编第922(a)(1)条,密谋在没有联邦枪支许可证的情况下从事枪支交易业务,以及就持证枪支经销商的记录提供虚假陈述而被起诉。随后,迪尔提交了驳回起诉的动议,对第922(a)(1)条中的许可证要求及相关记录保存要求是否符合宪法提出了质疑。
地区法院驳回了他的驳回起诉动议,认为联邦许可证要求和记录保存要求并不受第二修正案的影响,因为这些要求并不影响个人持有或携带武器的权利。法院进一步指出,即便联邦许可证要求受到第二修正案的影响,这些要求也与我国在枪支管理方面的历史传统是一致的……迪尔主要对地区法院驳回其撤销起诉动议的裁决提出质疑。具体而言,他认为《第二修正案》的明文规定涵盖了枪支销售问题,而第922(a)(1)条中的许可要求及相关记录保存要求与我国在枪支监管方面的历史传统相悖。
《第二修正案》的明文规定确实涉及枪支销售问题。正如我们在Reese v. BATFE案(第五巡回法院,2025年)中所指出的,“‘持有和携带武器’的权利无疑意味着购买武器的权利。”在口头辩论中,政府也承认《第二修正案》适用于枪支的商业销售。
因此,我们撤销地区法院驳回迪尔撤销起诉动议的裁决,并将案件发回地区法院继续审理。
(据我阅读的判决意见,这一裁决不影响有关虚假陈述的指控。)
何法官表示同意:令人欣慰的是,今天的法院再次确认了我们本应早就明白的事实——第二修正案中“持有和携带武器”的权利显然也包括武器的销售。显而易见,如果政府能够轻易禁止公民行使这些权利的手段,那么宪法权利便毫无意义。
我们持不同意见的同事认为,18 U.S.C. § 922(a)并非关乎宪法权利,而是涉及商业监管。下级地区法院也表达了同样的观点:“§ 922(a)(1)是对向他人销售/转让枪支这一商业行为的适度监管……联邦层面的许可和记录保存要求并不影响个人持有枪支的权利……这些要求仅适用于卖家。因此,被告未能说服本院,认为这些商业许可和记录保存要求会涉及第二修正案。”或者正如持异议意见的人简单表述的那样:“《第二修正案》……并未提及销售者”,因此“我认为枪支销售者并不在保护范围之内”。
按照这种逻辑,《第一修正案》也未提及销售者,那么想必书商也不在《第一修正案》的保护范围内。但这显然是不对的。
宪法权利就是宪法权利,无论是否需要获得补偿——我已多次指出这一点。如果在《第一修正案》下这是成立的,那么在针对第922(a)条的《第二修正案》争议中也应同样成立……
我们持异议的同事通过指出《第一修正案》与《第二修正案》在文本上的差异来回应。归根结底,她认为“言论自由”涵盖了销售行为,而“人民持有和携带武器的权利”则不涵盖。但恕我直言,我看不出她所说的文本差异。这一理论也难以与我们曾在维拉雷尔案中看到的情况相吻合……奥尔德姆法官与何法官一致同意该判决(尽管他们可能也撰写了未署名的个人意见):
首先需要探讨的问题是,对枪支销售的限制是否会损害美国公民的《第二修正案》所规定的权利。答案是肯定的,至少存在两种方式。首先,此类限制直接影响了卖方持有和携带武器的权利。其次,它们也影响了潜在买方的持有和携带武器权利,因为拥有某物的权利始终包含获取该物的权利。
从宪法文本来看,《第二修正案》并非仅仅禁止政府剥夺人们持有和携带武器的权利,而是规定这一权利不得被“侵犯”。在宪法制定之初,“侵犯”意味着“违反”、“破坏”或“阻碍”。因此,政府不得阻碍人们持有和携带武器的权利。销售限制妨碍了卖方和买方持有及使用武器的权利。首先来看卖方持有枪支的权利。《第二修正案》保障了人们为个人用途持有枪支的权利,而卖方也是依法可以持有枪支的个体。根据传统的财产法,拥有某物的权利“包括获取、使用和处置该物的权利”。因此,持有枪支的权利必然包含所有者按其意愿处置该枪支的权利。这并非一种独立的“销售权”。我的观点是,政府对枪支销售权利的干预本身就构成了对卖方该枪支现有财产权的负担,从而妨碍并侵犯了卖方的权利。同样的逻辑也适用于购买者。限制武器购买的规定无疑“侵犯”了购买者持有和携带武器的权利。毕竟,最高法院曾指出,“财产”所固有的就是“获取、使用和处置它的权利”。换言之,对武器销售的限制显然会影响到购买者获取武器的宪法权利。正如一位学者所解释的:
因为如果不先获取某物,就无法“持有”或“携带”它,所以获取武器的行为必然属于第二修正案所规定的“持有和携带武器的权利”范畴。这就好比,如果言论自由的权利不包含与其行使相关的金融交易权利,那么这一权利就会大打折扣。因为当对与某项权利密切相关且不可避免的行为进行限制时,实际上就是在对这项权利本身进行限制。Joseph G.S. Greenlee,《美国自制武器的传统》,54 St. Mary's L.J. 35(2023年)。
这一原则并不仅限于第二修正案所涉及的范畴。以相邻的第一修正案为例,言论自由条款“为公众提供了进行讨论、辩论以及传播信息和观点的途径”——因此显然保护了销售和传播言论的权利,包括由他人撰写或制作的言论。同时,它也保护接收者获取信息和观点的权利。Willis v. Town of Marshall案(第九巡回法院,2002年)(Kozinski法官附议):“倾听的权利与发言的权利是同一事物的两面。”如果没有表达言论的权利,也就不存在获取信息和观点的权利。同样,考虑一下宗教自由条款。 “宗教自由条款的文本赋予特定群体(那些希望‘行使宗教信仰’的人)在没有阻碍的情况下这样做的权利。” 一个不言而喻的事实是,宗教自由权包括与他人一起在诸如礼拜场所等地践行宗教信仰的权利。出于诸多原因,关闭礼拜场所显然违反了《第一修正案》——其中最主要的原因是这阻碍了信徒们彼此交流,以及与那些提供教义、圣礼和其他神圣传统的教会领袖交流。因此,行使宗教信仰的权利包含《第一修正案》所保障的与他人一起参与宗教仪式以及为他人提供宗教服务的自由。
这些例子体现了明确的准则。财产权、言论自由、集体礼拜以及持枪权都包含提供这些事物的权利,同时也包含获取这些事物的权利……奥尔德姆法官还探讨了第五巡回法院在U.S. v. Peterson(第五巡回法院,2025年)案中所作裁决的适当范围,并得出结论:该裁决(1)“是错误的,应当被推翻”;无论如何(2)也不适用于本案;欲了解更多内容,请阅读完整判决意见。
卡塔琳娜·海恩斯法官持异议意见:
我认为枪支销售者并不受第二修正案的保障(该修正案并未提及销售者)……{第二修正案与附议意见中提到的第一修正案有很大不同。第一修正案规定的是“言论自由”,并列举了范围相当广泛的人群,而第二修正案则规定的是“人民持有和携带武器的权利”,并未提及武器销售或所有相关情形。}[但] 鉴于我们之前的案例以及政府的表态,我尊重多数人的意见。因此,即便假设卖方确实适用相关规定,我也没有看到任何证据表明在此情况下针对卖方的规则不恰当,进而构成违宪。此外,在我看来,由于迪尔没有对相关规则提出有效质疑以证明其具有滥用性,因此没有必要就此发回重审。对我来说,针对他的相关规则已经足够且恰当,所以我将直接维持原判。我赞同霍法官和奥尔德姆法官的观点,即持有和携带武器的权利必然包括获取武器的权利,这意味着必须对武器销售的限制进行评估,以确保这些限制不会不当加重潜在购买者的权利负担。以此类推,法院一直承认人们拥有使用避孕措施的权利(参见格里斯沃尔德诉康涅狄格州案)。显然,这必然意味着禁止销售避孕措施会违宪地加重潜在购买者的权利负担,而对避孕措施销售施加更为有限的限制也可能被视为过于苛刻。但我对“第二修正案保障了独立于买家权利之外的卖家权利”这一观点持怀疑态度。书商可以说是在进行“言论表达”,因为向读者传递思想是一种言论形式(即便这种传递是以金钱为交换条件)。而枪支卖家实际上并没有“持有”枪支或“携带”枪支。虽然财产权通常包括通过销售等方式进行转让的权利,但我认为不应将第二修正案视为对这一权利的宪法确认。
打个比方,法律禁止向重刑犯转让枪支。法院认为,这一规定在宪法上是可行的,因为重刑犯没有持有枪支的权利(重点在于潜在枪支持有者的权利)。但我认为这并不意味着该法律涉及到了枪支卖家的权利。当法律禁止我向重刑犯出售枪支时,这根本不会影响我自己持有或携带枪支的能力。(1)将第二修正案视为保护枪支销售,以帮助购买者获得枪支;与(2)将第二修正案视为保护销售者自身的第二修正案权利,这两种理解之间的区别可能在实践中具有重要意义。根据第一种理论,对销售者进行监管的空间可能会更大,因为那些仅对购买者购买枪支的能力产生轻微影响的限制可能会被视为符合宪法的。(这与“D.C. v. Heller”案中的观点一致,即“我们认为,没有任何内容应被用来质疑……对武器商业销售设置条件和限制的法律”)。而根据第二种理论,对销售者进行监管的空间则会更小,因为销售者自身的权利也会受到影响。同样,关于使用避孕措施的权力,其区别也可能如此体现,而在多布斯案之前的罗伊/凯西时代,堕胎问题也是如此。例如,只要不过度妨碍女性获得堕胎服务的能力,堕胎权就与为实施堕胎手术的个人或机构设定的许可要求相一致。同样,在我看来,第二修正案所规定的持有和携带武器的权利,也与枪支销售商的许可要求相一致,只要这不会过度妨碍人们获得并持有枪支的能力。
原文
From Fifth Circuit Judges James Ho and Andrew Oldham in an unsigned opinion filed yesterday in U.S. v. Deare:
Jeremiah Deare was indicted for conspiracy to engage in the business of dealing firearms without a federal firearms license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) and for making false statements with respect to records of licensed firearms dealers. Deare then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, broadly challenging the constitutionality of § 922(a)(1)'s licensure requirement and related record-keeping requirements.
The district court denied his motion to dismiss, holding that federal licensing and record-keeping requirements are not implicated by the Second Amendment because such requirements do not affect an individual's right to keep or bear arms. The court further held that, even if federal licensing requirements are implicated by the Second Amendment, such requirements are consistent with our Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation….
Deare primarily challenges the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Specifically, he argues that the Second Amendment's plain text covers firearm sales, and that § 922(a)(1)'s licensure requirement and related record-keeping requirements are inconsistent with our Nation's history of firearm regulation.
The plain text of the Second Amendment covers the sale of firearms. As we noted in Reese v. BATFE (5th Cir. 2025), "the right to 'keep and bear arms' surely implies the right to purchase them." During oral argument, the government conceded that the Second Amendment applies to the commercial sale of firearms.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order denying Deare's motion to dismiss the indictment and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
(As I read the opinion, it doesn't affect the false statements charge.)
Judge Ho concurred:
It's gratifying that our court today reaffirms what we should have long understood—that the Second Amendment right to "keep and bear Arms" plainly encompasses the sale of arms as well. It seems obvious that constitutional rights are meaningless if the Government can simply prohibit the means by which citizens are able to exercise those rights.
Our dissenting colleague theorizes that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) is not about constitutional rights, but about commercial regulation. It's the same view expressed by the district court below: "§ 922(a)(1) is a modest regulation of the commercial activity of selling/transferring firearms to others…. [F]ederal licensure and record keeping requirements do not affect an individual's rights to possess firearms…. [T]hese requirements affect only the seller. As such, Defendants have failed to persuade this Court that these commercial licensure and recordkeeping requirements implicate the Second Amendment."
Or as the dissent puts it simply, "the Second Amendment … doesn't mention sellers," so "I do not think that the sellers of guns are covered."
By that logic, the First Amendment doesn't mention sellers, so presumably booksellers aren't covered by the First Amendment, either. But that can't be right.
Constitutional rights are constitutional rights, regardless of whether they're compensated—as I've noted on a number of occasions. And if that's true under the First Amendment, then it should be equally true in Second Amendment challenges to § 922(a) as well….
Our dissenting colleague responds by offering a textual distinction between the First and Second Amendments. At bottom, the dissent theorizes that the "freedom of speech" contemplates sales, whereas "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms" does not. But with respect, I don't see the textual distinction that she sees. The theory is also hard to square with what we saw in Villarreal.…
Judge Oldham, joined by Judge Ho, concurred in the judgment (though presumably they also joined their own unsigned opinion):
The first question presented is whether restrictions on the sale of firearms burden the Second Amendment rights of American citizens. They do—in at least two ways. First, such restrictions directly burden the seller's right to keep and bear arms. And second, they burden the prospective buyer's right to keep and bear arms, because the right to keep an item always includes the right to acquire it.
Start with the constitutional text. The Second Amendment does not just prohibit the government from denying the right to keep and bear arms. Instead, it says that the right cannot be "infringed." And at the Founding, "infringe" meant "violate," "destroy," or "hinder." Thus, the government cannot hinder the people's rights to keep and bear arms.
Restrictions on sale hinder both the seller's and buyer's right to keep and bear arms. Start with the seller's right to possess firearms. The Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep guns for personal use, and the seller is an individual who can lawfully possess guns. And it's hornbook property law that the right to possess an article "includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it." So the right to keep a gun must include the right to dispose of that gun as the owner sees fit. This is not an independent "right to sell." Rather, my point is that governmental interference with the right to sell a firearm is itself a burden on the seller's existing property right in that firearm. It hinders and hence infringes the seller's rights.
The same logic applies to the buyer. The buyer's ability to keep and bear arms is certainly "infringed" by regulations that hinder the purchase of arms. After all, the Supreme Court has explained that inherent in "property" is the "right to acquire, use, and dispose of it." In other words, a restriction on the sale of weapons obviously impacts the buyer's constitutional rights to acquire weapons. As one scholar has explained it:
Because one cannot 'keep' or 'bear' something without acquiring it, the act of acquiring arms must be included in the Second Amendment's 'right to keep and bear arms.' This is true for the same reason that the right to speak would be largely ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in financial transactions that are the incidents of its exercise. For there comes a point at which the regulation of action intimately and unavoidably connected with a right is a regulation of the right itself.
Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The American Tradition of Self-Made Arms, 54 St. Mary's L.J. 35 (2023).
This principle is not limited to the Second Amendment context. For example, consider the neighboring First Amendment. The Free Speech Clause "afford[s] the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas"—and thus clearly protects the right to sell and distribute speech, including speech written or produced by others. And it protects the recipient's right to receive information and ideas. Willis v. Town of Marshall (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("[T]he right to hear and the right to speak are flip sides of the same coin."). Without a right to provide speech, there is no right to receive information and ideas.
Likewise, consider the Free Exercise Clause. "[T]he text of the Free Exercise Clause gives a specific group of people (those who wish to engage in the 'exercise of religion') the right to do so without hindrance." It is axiomatic that the right to free exercise of religion includes the right to practice it with others in, for example, houses of worship. Shutting down houses of worship is an obvious First Amendment violation for many reasons—not the least of which is that it prevents the faithful from communing with each other and with church leaders who provide teaching, holy sacraments, and other sacred traditions. Thus, the right to exercise religion includes a First Amendment freedom to participate in religious services with—and provide religious services to—others.
These examples demonstrate clear principles. A right to property, free speech, corporate worship, and firearms includes the right to provide these things. And to acquire them….
Judge Oldham also discussed the proper scope of a Fifth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Peterson (5th Cir. 2025) and concludes that it (1) "was wrong and should be overturned" and in any event (2) doesn't apply here; for more on that, read the full opinion.
Judge Catharina Haynes dissented:
I do not think that the sellers of guns are covered by the Second Amendment (which doesn't mention sellers) …. {Second Amendment is quite different from the First Amendment mentioned in the concurrence. The First Amendment states "freedom of speech" and lists people in general which is quite large whereas the Second Amendment says "the right of people to keep and bear Arms" not mentioning selling Arms or all situations.}
[But] I am respectful of the majority opinion on that given our prior cases and what the government said. So, even assuming arguendo the sellers are covered, I see nothing in this case that shows that the rules for the sellers in this context are inappropriate and, therefore, unconstitutional. Also, to me, since Deare did not properly challenge the relevant rules to show that they are abusive, I do not see a need to remand on that. To me, the relevant rules as to him are sufficient and proper, so I would simply affirm.
I appreciate Judge Ho's and Judge Oldham's arguments that the right to keep and bear arms must include the right to acquire them, which in turn means that restrictions on sales must be evaluated to make sure they don't improperly burden the rights of would-be buyers. By way of analogy, the Court continues to recognize a right to use contraceptives (see Griswold v. Connecticut). Surely that must mean that a ban on selling contraceptives would unconstitutionally burden the would-be buyers' rights, and even less comprehensive restrictions on selling them might likewise be seen as too burdensome.
But I'm skeptical of the argument that the Second Amendment secures a right of sellers independent of the right of buyers. A bookseller may be said to be engaged in "speech" in the sense that conveying ideas to readers is a form of speech (including when one conveys them in exchange for money). A gun seller, on the other hand, isn't actually "keeping" a gun or "bearing" it. And though property rights do generally include the right to convey, including by sale, I don't think the Second Amendment should be seen as constitutionalizing that
By way of analogy, the law bans transferring guns to felons. That, the Court has said, is presumptively constitutional, because felons don't have the right to possess guns (focusing on the rights of the would-be gun possessor). But I don't think it follows that the law even implicates the right of gun sellers. When the law bans me from selling a gun to a felon, it isn't affecting my own ability to keep or bear the gun at all.
And this distinction between (1) the Second Amendment protecting gun sales as facilitative of the buyer's ability to have a gun, and (2) the Second Amendment gun sales as protecting the seller's own Second Amendment rights, may be practically significant. Under theory 1, there would likely be more room for regulation of sellers, since restrictions that only very modestly affect the buyer's ability to buy guns might then be viewed as presumptively constitutional. (That's consistent with D.C. v. Heller's statement that "nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on … laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms"). Under theory 2, there would be less room for regulation of sellers, since the sellers' own rights would be at stake as well.
Again, that's also how the distinction might play out as to the right to use contraceptives, and how it played out as to abortion in the pre-Dobbs Roe/Casey era. For instance, the right to abortion was consistent with licensure requirements for people or organizations that perform abortions, so long as this didn't unduly interfere with women's ability to get abortions. Likewise, it seems to me, the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is consistent with licensure requirements for gun sellers, so long as it doesn't unduly interfere with people's ability to get guns that they can then keep and bear.