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“原意与言论与新闻自由”:“证据不足:煽动骚乱”

来源:Reason 杂志发布 上传时间 (多伦多时间)1 家来源 · 1 篇报道

中文译文

我正在将我发表在《圣母大学法律评论》上的新文章《原意与言论与新闻自由:一些实例》进行序列化处理,以下是第二部分:

现在让我转向另一个问题,关于这个问题的证据虽有趣但十分有限:当时人们是否认为言论自由包括那些可能引发不满进而导致骚乱的言论?(当然,这个问题在最近的一些案件中经常被提及,比如特梅尼洛诉芝加哥案(1949年)和福赛斯县诉民族主义运动案(1992年)。)事实上,在我发现一个早期的相关案例之前,我从未见过任何相关证据。这个案例在过去的五十年里似乎几乎未被讨论过,或许是因为它没有收录在Westlaw或Lexis数据库中。该案为“联邦政府诉海恩斯案”(1824年),是由宾夕法尼亚州最高法院法官约翰·吉布森(后来担任首席法官)作为独任审判法官作出的判决。海恩斯被指控在“一个主要由来自爱尔兰的移民居住的社区”里“竖立并固定一个类似人的雕像,通常被称为‘帕迪’,作为圣帕特里克的雕像……旁边还放着一个朗姆酒瓶和一串土豆”,从而故意引发骚乱。“展示‘帕迪’雕像被视为对爱尔兰天主教徒的侮辱……”

主要的法律争议在于被告是否参与了该雕像的展示,但各方都承认被告确实展示了一个“谢拉”——“一个女性雕像……除了性别特征外,还有其他几处特点使其有别于‘帕迪’雕像”。显然,这样的“谢拉雕像”常常被作为对“帕迪雕像”的报复性象征而展示出来。经过一段时间的商议,陪审团询问是否可以基于被告参与了展示“Shelah”而非“Paddy”这一事实来作出有罪判决。吉布森法官“实际上回答说,如果‘Shelah’的特征和对象与‘Paddy’的不同,那么与起诉书中的描述存在差异就会导致判决无效;但两者是否相同或存在差异的问题则由陪审团来决定。”(最终陪审团作出了无罪裁决。)事实上,在引用海恩斯观点的资料中,有相当一部分是围绕证据在多大程度上可以与起诉书有所差异这一问题展开的。

不过吉布森法官也向陪审团作出了如下指示:第一项指控中所规定的罪行,显然属于普通法范畴内的可起诉罪行。任何人都没有权利肆意挑拨大量民众的情绪,从而诱使他们扰乱公共秩序。如果这种行为是通过诽谤手段实施的,没人会怀疑它属于轻罪;若是通过制作讽刺画像的方式实施,难道就不算轻罪吗?假设被告发表了与当前罪行所涉及的画像性质相同、意图相同的图片,那难道不会被视为诽谤吗?该罪行的核心在于其具有诱发公共秩序混乱的倾向。该地区的爱尔兰居民对这类行为予以关注或许有些轻率,但其他人若故意挑拨他们这么做,那就更为不当了。

这便是一个来自早期共和国时期的案例,说明了在何种情况下言论可能受到惩罚。如果吉布森法官关于1824年宾夕法尼亚州法律以及更广泛的“普通法”的观点是正确的,那么这个案例或许能体现“言论自由”最初的含义。从原则上讲,此案或许与《第一修正案》相关的重大辩论有关。人们可能会问,例如,这一案例是否能为限制焚烧国旗的行为提供依据,其理由是焚烧国旗同样“会触犯大量民众的感情,从而激使他们扰乱公共秩序”。

或者人们可能会探讨,这一案例如何更广泛地关联到斯卡利亚大法官在麦金太尔案中所作的论述,即“如果《第一修正案》背后存在一项根本原则,那就是政府不得仅仅因为社会认为某种观点具有冒犯性或令人反感,就禁止其表达。”(斯卡利亚大法官在此解释了他为何认为焚烧国旗在宪法上应受到保护,尽管自1890年代及此后数十年间一直存在禁止焚烧国旗的传统。)或许,至少对于那些旨在冒犯他人而公开展示的冒犯性言论而言,这种保护并非《第一修正案》背后的根本原则。人们或许还可以探讨吉布森法官所援引的这一原则的适用范围。它是否仅适用于那些确实会引发骚乱的情形,就像在海恩斯案中那样?只要某行为有引发骚乱的倾向,就足够了吗?如果它引发或有可能引发“扰乱治安”的行为,哪怕只是某名观众与挑事者之间的斗殴,这也足够了吗?

这一原则是否仅限于故意的挑衅行为(“招惹情绪”这一表述或许就暗示了这一点),这样一来,出于正当动机但具有冒犯性的言论就不应受到惩罚?可参考“Respublica v.”案。丹尼案(1805年),这是一起发生于1805年的宾夕法尼亚州煽动性诽谤案:当地法院裁定,以颠覆美国宪法为目的批评政府的行为可被视为煽动性诽谤而受到惩处——但“出于真诚意图向公众传达信息、警示他们注意社会中的潜在危险,即便相关论述可能存在错误”的批评行为则受宪法保护。

问题在于,海恩斯案似乎是那个时代唯一探讨这一问题的案例。我曾对早期美国涉及言论限制的案例进行过大量研究,但并未发现其他类似案例。海恩斯案本身也没有引用任何相关先例。直到1899年,我才找到有案例引用了海恩斯案,而那些案例以及之后少数引用海恩斯案的案例也并未直接涉及这一问题。{我找到的第一起在涉及涉嫌煽动骚乱的言论时引用海恩斯案的案例是“联邦诉斯巴达科案”(宾夕法尼亚州最高法院)。}1932年的一起案件中,一名被告大声抗议贝尼托·墨索里尼的外交部长迪诺·格兰迪的到访(后者后来因在1943年提出决议而实际上导致墨索里尼下台而闻名)。斯帕尔塔科案的法官将海恩斯的观点解读为涵盖那些“出于煽动骚乱的意图,或出于轻率且故意无视其可能引发的后果而说出的话”。

法院该如何看待这样的个别案件呢?或许可以将其视为与早期支持亵渎法案的案例有关联,但两者的依据实际上截然不同:例如,那些亵渎法案通常并非基于对骚乱的担忧。就目前而言,我们对当时法律的实际内容只能有某种有趣的推测——当然也有可能根本无法确定。

原文

I'm serializing my new Notre Dame Law Review article, "Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative Examples"; here's the second Part:

Let me turn now to a different question, as to which the evidence is intriguing but scant: Was freedom of expression understood as including expression that created resentment that risked provoking riots? (This question has of course arisen often more recently, in cases such as Terminiello v. Chicago (1949) and Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement (1992).) In fact, I hadn't seen any evidence until I came across one early case, which has been apparently virtually undiscussed during the last fifty years, perhaps because it's not on Westlaw or Lexis.

The case is Commonwealth v. Haines (1824), a decision by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice John Gibson (later the Chief Justice), apparently sitting alone as a trial judge. Haines had been accused of intentionally causing a riot by "erecting and fixing, a certain figure, resembling a man, commonly called a Paddy, as and for the effigy of St. Patrick … with the accompaniment of a rum bottle and a string of potatoes," in "a neighborhood inhabited principally by emigrants from Ireland." "[T]he exhibition of a Paddy was resented as an insult upon the Catholic portion of the Irish …."

The main legal complication was that defendants' involvement in displaying the Paddy was disputed, but there was no dispute that the defendant had displayed a "Shelah"—"a female figure … with several features, besides that of sex, distinguishing it from a Paddy." Such a Shelah was apparently "often displayed as a retaliatory emblem" to the Paddy.

After deliberating for some time, the jury asked whether it could convict based on a finding that defendant was involved in exhibiting the Shelah rather than the Paddy. Justice Gibson "answered in effect, that, if the characteristics and object of the Shelah were different from those of the Paddy, the variance [from the indictment] was fatal; but that the question of the identity or dissimilarity of the two was for the jury." (The jury ultimately acquitted.) Indeed, of the sources that cite Haines, a considerable fraction does so on this question of how far the proof may diverge from the indictment.

But Justice Gibson also charged the jury thus:

The offence specified in the first count, is clearly indictable at common law. No man has a right to trifle with the feelings of any large class of men, so as to provoke them to a breach of the peace. If it is done by libel, no one doubts it is a misdemeanor; if it is done by effigy is it less so? Suppose the defendant had published a picture of the same character, and with the same tendency as the figure which is the subject of the present offence, would it not be held a libel? The gist of the offence, is its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace. It may be indiscreet in the Irish residents of the district to take notice of acts of the kind; but it is worse than indiscreet in others to provoke them to do so.

So here's a case from the early republic on when speech can be punished. And it is possibly a case that bears on the original meaning of "the freedom of speech," if Justice Gibson was correct not just about Pennsylvania 1824 law but about the "common law" more broadly.

In principle, the case might therefore bear on important First Amendment debates. One might ask whether it would, for instance, justify restrictions on flag burning, on the theory that flag burning likewise "trifle[s] with the feelings of [a] large class of men, so as to provoke them to a breach of the peace."

Or one might ask how the case bears more broadly on Justice Scalia's observation in McIntyre that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." (Justice Scalia was explaining there why he thought flag burning was constitutionally protected, despite the presence of a contrary tradition, dating back to 1890 and the following decades, of flag burning bans.) Perhaps such protection for offensive messages, at least when publicly displayed in order to offend, is not indeed a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment.

One might also inquire into the scope of the principle that Justice Gibson was invoking. Does it apply only to situations where the action does provoke a riot, as it apparently did in Haines? Is it enough if it has a tendency to provoke a riot? Is it enough if it provokes or has a tendency to provoke a "breach of the peace," which might be as little as just a fight between one viewer and the provoker?

Is the principle limited to purposeful provocation (which the phrase "trifle with the feelings" might suggest), so that engaging in well-motivated but offensive speech wouldn't be punishable? Compare Respublica v. Dennie (1805), an 1805 Pennsylvania seditious libel case: The court there held that criticizing the government with the purpose to subvert the Constitution of the United States could be punished as seditious libel—but criticism "honestly meant to inform the public mind, and warn them against supposed dangers in society, though the subject may have been treated erroneously" was constitutionally protected.

The trouble is that Haines appears to be the only case from that era that considered the matter. I've done a good deal of research on early American cases dealing with speech restrictions, but I haven't found any others. Haines doesn't cite any relevant precedents. I couldn't find any cases that in turn cite Haines until 1899, and that case and the few later cases citing Haines didn't squarely deal with the issue. {The first case I could find that cited in Haines in dealing with speech that allegedly incited a riot was Commonwealth v. Spartaco (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932), which involved a defendant loudly expostulating against a visit of Benito Mussolini's foreign minister, Dino Grandi (who would later be known for introducing the resolution that effectively removed Mussolini from office in 1943). The judge in Spartaco interpreted Haines as covering words said "with intent to provoke a riot or with a reckless and willful disregard of their probable outcome in that respect."}

What can courts make of an isolated case such as this one? Perhaps one can view it as being connected to the early cases upholding blasphemy laws, but their rationales are actually quite different: The blasphemy cases, for instance, do not generally rest on any concern about rioting. As it stands, we have an intriguing understanding of what the law perhaps was at the time—or perhaps not.