其他
第五巡回上诉法院全庭裁定众议院新冠代理投票规则违宪
中文译文
今日,在“得克萨斯州诉布兰奇案”中,美国第五巡回上诉法院全体法官裁定,众议院在新冠疫情期间采用的代理投票规则违反了法定人数条款。
由威尔逊法官撰写的判决意见,得到了埃尔罗德首席法官以及琼斯、史密斯、威利特、霍、邓肯、恩格尔哈特和奥尔德姆法官的赞同,内容如下:
在新冠疫情期间,众议院通过了一项规则,允许议员通过代理方式表明自己的出席情况,以此确定法定人数。众议院在通过2023年综合拨款法案时采用了这一规则,通过将数百名实际未出席的议员视为通过代理出席来达到法定人数要求。随后参议院通过了该法案,总统也将其签署为法律。得克萨斯州主张,众议院的代理人出席规则与宪法中的法定人数条款相悖,这意味着众议院并未合法通过该法案。参见《美国宪法》第一条第五款第一项。基于这一观点,得克萨斯州要求对法案中的某一部分——即《孕妇工人公平法案》——采取禁令措施。联邦政府则回应称,已登记的法案规则规定,法案在立法机构通过即视为其真实性的确凿证据,因此无需对法案的通过是否遵守法定人数条款进行司法审查。此外,政府还主张法定人数条款允许代理人出席。
地区法院裁定,已登记的法案规则并不适用,且众议院通过代理人出席规则来通过该法案的行为违反了法定人数条款。因此,地区法院命令联邦政府不得对得克萨斯州实施《孕妇工人公平法案》的相关规定。我们得出结论,登记议案规则并不妨碍我们进行审查,因为德克萨斯州提出的宪法质疑并未涉及该法案通过过程中的事实争议。我们进一步认定,该法案的通过是违宪的,因为法定人数条款不允许在确定法定人数时计入代理人。该条款的文本、背景、最初的含义以及一贯的历史适用情况均表明,为满足法定人数的要求,国会议员必须亲自出席——正如最高法院在125多年前明确规定的那样,也正如自美国建国以来国会一直遵循的做法。“代理人出席”并不算数。尽管立法机构的各个议院在议事规则方面拥有很大自主权,但法定人数条款对国会权力的限制不能通过国会的决议来规避。因此,我们维持地区法院的判决。马歇尔·菲尔德案中阐述的“登记议案原则”并不妨碍对得克萨斯州关于法定人数的条款质疑进行司法审查。关于众议院通过该法案的事实并无争议,因此无需审查任何外部证据。相反,各方都承认,众议院之所以声称已达到法定人数,只是因为将数百名代理人视为“在场”。因此,得克萨斯州的质疑完全取决于该法定人数条款的正确含义。
从这一角度而言,众议院通过2023年综合拨款法案违反了该法定人数条款。该条款的文本、背景、最初的解读以及历史上的适用情况均表明,不得将代理人计入以构成法定人数。正如最高法院所认定的,也正如国会230多年来一直遵循的做法,必须要有议员亲自在场才能满足法定人数条款的要求,仅靠代理人代出席是不足的。缺席的议员将其代理人的授权交给他人,并不能使该议员在达到法定人数的要求上被视为在场。得克萨斯州已履行其举证责任,证明自己有权针对《孕妇工人公平法案》申请永久禁令。
格雷夫斯法官撰写了反对意见,斯图尔特、里奇曼、索思威克、希金森、道格拉斯和拉米雷斯法官也加入了这一意见。意见开头写道:
在本案中,得克萨斯州寻求颁布一项初步禁令,阻止2023年《综合拨款法案》中《孕妇工人公平法案》相关条款的施行,试图在保留数百万美元联邦资金的同时,取消国会为孕妇工人及新父母提供的保护。
2020年5月15日,为应对COVID-19疫情,众议院通过了第965号决议,允许委员会以远程方式开展会议并进行远程投票。第965号决议规定:1. [A]在议长……接到通知……表明因新型冠状病毒而出现的公共卫生紧急状态已经生效后的任何时间,议长……可指定一段时期……在这段时期内,由另一名议员根据第2条指定为代理人的议员,可代为投票或代表该议员在议院中登记出席。
H.R. Res. 965 § 1(a),第116届国会(2020年)。
第2条规定了通过指定代理人进行远程参与的流程:指定代理人必须向书记员提交一封署名信件,其中需明确指定被代理的议员。同上,第2条。第3条说明了在指定时期内进行投票的流程,除非另有延长,该期限在议长或其指定人员指定该时期后的四十五天内有效。同上,第1(b)条和第3条。第4条授权进行远程委员会会议。同上,第4条。第5条要求众议院行政委员会主席证明利用技术进行远程投票在众议院是可行的,同时要求规则委员会主席提交有关实施远程投票的规章,一旦这些规章制定完毕,则允许进行远程投票。同上,第5条。第6条要求在可行的范围内,按照现有的众议院规则执行第1、2和3条的规定。同上,第6条。在第117届国会期间,众议院通过第8号决议重申了这一做法,并继续予以实施。H.R. Res. 8 § 3(s),第117届国会(2021年)。此处的问题在于:众议院在投票并通过2023年综合拨款法案时采用了这些程序。参见《168届国会记录》H10,529页(2022年12月23日每日版)。根据众议院规则,由435名议员组成的众议院的法定人数为简单多数,即218人。参见《众议院规则》第XX条第6(b)款,H.R. Doc. No. 116-177,第873–74页(2021年)。该法案最终通过的投票结果为225票赞成、201票反对、1票“弃权”以及4票未投票。参见《168届国会记录》H10,528页(2022年12月23日每日版)。在431票中,205票由议员亲自投票,226票通过代理人远程投票。参见同上,H10,529页。尽管投票时实际到场的议员人数未达到多数,但没有任何议员提出缺乏法定人数的异议。德克萨斯州的众议员奇普·罗伊指出实际并未达到法定人数,并保留了提出异议的权利。针对罗伊议员关于如何构成法定人数的系列询问,临时议长G.K.巴特菲尔德众议员回应称,根据众议院第8号决议,通过投票或由代理人代为表明出席意愿的议员均计入法定人数之中,因此已构成法定人数。
该法案在众议院通过后,国会两院的议长们打印并签署了该法案。参见《美国法典》第1编第106条。此时,它便成为了一项“正式登记的法案”。该正式登记的法案随后被送交总统,总统签署了《2023年综合拨款法案》,使其成为法律。参见《公共法律第117-328号》,《法规汇编》第136卷第4459页(2022年)。这项价值1.7万亿美元的政府拨款法案是依据众议院规则通过的,其中包括众议院第8号决议,该决议允许议员在新冠病毒大流行期间通过代理人远程登记出席情况。该法案共获得了431票支持。当时没有议员提出出席人数不足的问题。然而,得克萨斯州虽然接受了国会拨给它的绝大部分资金,但现在却声称该法案中为孕妇和劳动者提供保护的条款违反了宪法中的法定人数条款。
得克萨斯州认为该法案无效,因为法定人数条款要求在投票时必须有大多数议员亲自出现在众议院会议厅内。为此,得克萨斯州请求法院在宪法的法定人数条款中增加一项额外要求。我同意多数意见的观点,即“登记议案规则”并不妨碍我们对此项特定的宪法挑战进行审查。然而,我无法认同他们为“法定人数条款”增加的新要求。尽管多数意见声称其推理仅限于“法定人数条款是否允许将代理人出席情况计入法定人数之中”这一问题(见原文第17–18页),但其结论的实际范围要宽得多。所谓“法定人数条款涉及的是实际在场人数”这一结论,实际上是将一个范围更广的要求强行纳入宪法之中(见原文第28页)。鉴于《宪法》第一篇第五节第一款的具体文本、历史惯例以及制宪者意图的相关证据,均不利于多数意见所提出的这一“实际在场人数”要求,我谨表示反对。
海恩斯法官并未加入反对意见,但判决书中的一则脚注写道:
海恩斯法官表示,她认为驳回该主张并不合适。在这一点上,联邦众议院持不同意见,因此她也表达了异议。她同时赞赏格雷夫斯法官的异议意见。
尽管多数意见声称其裁决范围有限,仅阻止《孕妇工人公平法案》在德克萨斯州的实施,但其论证逻辑实际上可以为废除综合法案中的其他所有条款提供依据,这些条款涵盖从禁止在政府设备上使用TikTok到选举计票改革及总统过渡完善法案等各种内容。
我怀疑这一裁决能够维持下去。我不确定“法定人数条款”是否具有可诉性,也看不出最高法院会以此为由推翻所有受影响的立法。
针对此案的调卷令申请其实已经很明确。另一个不确定因素是,德克萨斯州的新任司法部长可能不会继续推进相关诉讼。
更多德里克·穆勒在选举法博客上的文章。
原文
Today, in Texas v. Blanche, the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the proxy voting rule adopted by the House of Representatives during the COVID-19 pandemic violated the Quorum Clause.
The opinion, by Judge Wilson, joined by Chief Judge Elrod and Judges Jones, Smith, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, and Oldham begins:
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the House of Representatives adopted a rule allowing Members to record their presence by proxy for purposes of establishing a quorum. The House used this rule when passing the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 (the Act), having mustered a quorum by counting hundreds of otherwise absent Members as present by proxy. The Senate then passed the bill, and the President signed it into law.
The State of Texas argues that the House's proxy-presence rule is inconsistent with the Constitution's Quorum Clause, which would mean that the House did not validly pass the Act. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Based on that proposition, Texas seeks injunctive relief against just one portion of the Act: The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA). The federal Government responds that the enrolled-bill rule, which instructs that a bill's passage through the legislature is conclusive proof of its authenticity, precludes judicial review of whether the Act's passage complied with the Quorum Clause. Alternatively, the Government argues that the Quorum Clause permits proxy presence.
The district court held that the enrolled-bill rule did not apply and that the House's passage of the Act—through use of the proxy-presence rule —violated the Quorum Clause. Accordingly, the district court enjoined the Government from enforcing the PWFA against Texas.
We conclude that the enrolled-bill rule does not bar our review because Texas's constitutional challenge does not implicate a dispute of fact regarding the Act's passage. We further conclude that the Act's passage was unconstitutional because the Quorum Clause does not allow proxies to be included when establishing a quorum. The Clause's text, context, original understanding, and unbroken historical application all indicate that Members of Congress must be present for quorum purposes—as the Supreme Court expressly held over 125 years ago, and as Congress has done ever since the Founding. "Proxy presence" does not count. While the chambers of the legislature have much discretion regarding their rules of procedure, the Quorum Clause's constraints on congressional power cannot be circumvented by congressional fiat. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
And from its closing portions:
The enrolled-bill doctrine articulated in Marshall Field does not preclude judicial review of Texas's Quorum Clause challenge. There are no disputed facts regarding the House's passage of the Act such that we would need to sift any extrinsic evidence. On the contrary, the parties agree that the House purportedly established a quorum only because it counted hundreds of proxies as "present." Texas's challenge therefore depends solely on the Quorum Clause's proper meaning.
Through that lens, the House's passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 contravened the Quorum Clause. The Clause's text, context, original understanding, and historical application all indicate that proxies may not be counted to establish a quorum. As the Supreme Court has held, and as Congress had previously done for over 230 years, Members must be present to satisfy the Quorum Clause. Presence-by-proxy does not suffice. An absent Member's assignment of his or her proxy cannot render that Member present for purposes of the Quorum Clause. Texas has carried its burden to show that it is entitled to a permanent injunction against the PWFA.
Judge Graves wrote the dissent, joined by Judges Stewart, Richman, Southwick, Higginson, Douglas, and Ramirez. It begins:
In this suit, the State of Texas sought a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of one portion of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), attempting to veto Congress's protections for pregnant workers and new parents while retaining millions in federal funding.
On May 15, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the House of Representatives adopted House Resolution 965, which authorized remote committee proceedings and remote voting in the House. Resolution 965 provides that:
1. [A]t any time after the Speaker . . . is notified . . . that a public health emergency due to a novel coronavirus is in effect, the Speaker . . . may designate a period . . . during which a Member who is designated by another Member as proxy in accordance with section 2 may cast the vote of such other Member or record the presence of such other Member in the House.
H.R. Res. 965 § 1(a), 116th Cong. (2020).
Section 2 described the process for remote participation through designating proxies: the designating Member had to submit a signed letter to the Clerk that specified the designated Member. Id. § 2. Section 3 outlined the process for voting during covered periods, which, absent an extension, ran for forty-five days after the Speaker, or their designee, designated such a period. Id. §§ 1(b), 3. Section 4 authorized remote Committee proceedings. Id. § 4. Section 5 mandated that the chair of the Committee on House Administration certify that it would be feasible to use technology to conduct remote voting in the House, required that the chair of the Committee on Rules submit regulations providing for the implementation of remote voting, and provided for remote voting once those regulations were in place. Id. § 5. Section 6 required that Sections 1, 2, and 3 be carried out in accordance with existing House rules to the extent practicable. Id. § 6. During the 117th Congress, the House reaffirmed this practice in House Resolution 8 and continued to apply it. H.R. Res. 8 § 3(s), 117th Cong. (2021).
At issue here: the House used these procedures as it voted on and passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. See 168 Cong. Rec. H10,529 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2022). Under House rules, a quorum of the 435-Member House is a simple majority: 218. See, e.g., Rules of the House of Representatives, R. XX, cl. 6(b), H.R. Doc. No. 116-177, at 873–74 (2021). The vote on the final passage of the Act was 225 yeas, 201 nays, 1 "present," and 4 non-votes. 168 Cong. Rec. H10,528 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2022). Out of the 431 votes, 205 votes were cast by Members in person and 226 were cast remotely by proxy. See id. at H10,529.
Even though less than a majority was physically present at the time of the vote, no Member objected that a quorum was lacking. Id. Representative Chip Roy of Texas, however, noted that a physical quorum was not present and reserved the right to object. Id. In response to a series of parliamentary inquiries from Representative Roy as to how a quorum was present, the Speaker Pro Tempore, Representative G.K. Butterfield, responded that a quorum was present because "Members casting their vote or recording their presence by proxy [we]re counted for the purpose of establishing a quorum" pursuant to House Resolution 8. Id.
After the Act passed the House, presiding officers of both chambers of Congress printed and signed the bill. See 1 U.S.C. § 106. At that point, it was an "enrolled bill." Id. The enrolled bill was then sent to the President, who signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 into law. See Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136 Stat. 4459 (2022).
The $1.7 trillion-dollar government funding bill was passed in accordance with House Rules, including House Resolution 8, which allowed members to record their presence remotely by proxy during the coronavirus pandemic. 431 votes were cast with respect to the bill. At the time, no Member objected that a quorum was lacking. Nonetheless, the State of Texas, having accepted the vast majority of the funds that Congress appropriated to it, now contends that the portion of the bill providing protections for pregnant women and workers violates the Quorum Clause.
Texas contends that the Act is invalid because the Quorum Clause required that a majority of Members be physically present on the House floor at the time of the vote. In so doing, Texas asks the courts to graft an additional requirement to the Quorum Clause of the Constitution.
I agree with the majority that the enrolled-bill rule does not bar our review of this particular constitutional challenge. However, I cannot agree with their addition of a new requirement to the Quorum Clause. Even though the majority declares that its reasoning is limited to the question of "whether the Quorum Clause allows proxy presence to be included in the quorum count," ante at 17–18, their conclusion is far more expansive. The conclusion that "[t]he Quorum Clause is concerned with physical presence" shoehorns a much larger requirement into the Constitution. Ante at 28. Because the plain text of Article I, Section 5, Clause 1, historical practice, and evidence of the framers' intent all weigh against the addition of the majority's new "physical presence" requirement, I respectfully dissent.
Judge Haynes did not join the dissent, but a footnote to the opinion reads:
Judge Haynes states that she does not think it is appropriate to throw out the
Federal House of Representatives in this arena, so she dissents. She also appreciates
Judge Graves's dissent.
Although the majority purports to offer a narrow holding, and only blocks enforcement of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act in Texas, the opinions rationale would provide a basis for invalidating everything else in the omnibus bill, which included everything from the ban on using TikTok on government devices to the Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Improvement Act.
I doubt this decision will stand. I am not sure the Quorum Clause is justiciable, and I cannot see the Supreme Court upending all of the affected legislation on this basis.
The petition for certiorari in this case writes itself. Another wild card is that the new Attorney General of Texas may not press its case.
More from Derek Muller on Election Law Blog.